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I.

Introduction

A long-standing rule of landlord and tenant law is that leases may
be assigned and premises sublet at the pleasure of the tenant, unless
the lease specifically provides otherwise.' The law generally does not
favor restrictions on the alienability of property; 2 however, if a lease
states that it is non-transferable 3 or that it is transferable only upon
* B.B.A., Baruch College of the City University of New York; J.D., LL.M., New York
University School of Law. Member of the New York Bar.
** Class of 1977, New York University School of Law. B.A., M.S., Roosevelt University.
1. See 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 246[1], at 372.85 (Rohan ed. 1975); J.
RASCH, NEW YORK LANDLORD AND TENANT 320 (2d ed. 1971); 3A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY

24 (Grimes ed. 1959).
2. See, e.g., Francis v. Ferguson, 246 N.Y. 516 (1927); Riggs v. Pursell, 66 N.Y. 193 (1876);
see also POWELL, supra note 1,

24611], at 372.97; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1944).

3. For the sake of brevity, the term "transfer" will be used when the text applies both to
an assignment of the lease and to the subletting of the premises. Where only one of the latter
terms is intended, the appropriate one will be used.
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the landlord's consent, the courts will enforce the parties' bargain.'
Absent any qualifications on his right, the landlord may withhold
his consent even if that withholding is unreasonable.5 But if the
lease provides that the landlord may not withhold consent unreasonably, the landlord must establish that his actions are reasonable.'
This latter provision-that the landlord shall not unreasonably
withhold his consent to a transfer of the lease-is the focus of this
Article. Frequently used in commercial and residential leases,7 the
provision is generally assumed to have a clear and well-established
meaning.' Several jurisdictions have even enacted statutes proscribing the unreasonable withholding of consent in certain circumstances.0 Yet most jurisdictions which have passed such legislation do not define the concept of "unreasonable withholding of
consent," presumably concluding that it has a "well-established"
or "generally known" usage. Closer examination indicates, however, that the meaning of the term is neither "well-established'
4. See, e.g., Willoughby v. Lawrence, 116 Ill.
11, 4 N:E. 356 (1886); Stern v. Thayer, 56
Minn. 93, 57 N.W. 329 (1894); see also Clasen v. Moore Bros. Realty Co., 413 S.W.2d 592
(Mo. 1967); De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467 (1852).

5. See

WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK REAL PROPRTY

§ 1804 (4th ed. 1976).

6. See, e.g., Friedman v. Thomas J. Fisher& Co., 88 A.2d 321 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1952); Dress
Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinique Assocs., 12 N.Y.2d 339, 190 N.E.2d 10, 239 N.Y.S.2d
660 (1963); Ogden v. Riverview Holding Corp., 134 Misc. 149, 234 N.Y.S. 678 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
226 App. Div. 882, 235 N.Y.S. 850 (1st Dep't 1929).
7. See, e.g., Rock County Savings & Trust Co. v. Yost's, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 360, 153 N.W.2d
594 (1967) (provision is a "usual compromise" between the lessor and lessee in commercial
leases); see also Halper, A New Lease on Apartment Life for Tenants, MONEY 96, 97 (June
1976) (suggesting that such provisions be included in ordinary apartment leases).
8. See, e.g., Nassif v. Boston & Maine R.R., 340 Mass. 557, 565, 165 N.E.2d 397, 402
(1960)(there are "usual standards of reasonableness.").
9. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. 25, § 5512 (b)(1974); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW. 99 226-b, 236 (McKinney 1968) as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975). See also
Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 191:
In all leases whether made before or after the commencement of this Act containing
a covenant condition or agreement against assigning, underletting, changing or parting
with the possession of demised premises or any part thereof without license of consent,
such covenant condition or agreement shall, notwithstanding any express provision to
the contrary, be deemed to be subject (a) to a proviso to the effect that such license or consent is not to be unreasonably
witheld, but this provision does not preclude the right of the landlord to require
payment of a reasonable sum in respect to any legal or other expenses incurred in
connection with such license or consent . . ..
See also MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2-403 (Tent. Draft, 1969).
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nor "generally known." Most courts which have had occasion to
interpret the phrase have either used broad generalities which
are analytically meaningless'0 or have not attempted to define the
phrase at all." The most extensive judicial analysis merely listed
general categories of objections which could form the basis for reasonable refusal to consent." Moreover, even the commentators seem
to have overlooked this area.' 3
The Article will attempt to analyze the common law parameters
of "unreasonable withholding of consent.""
II.

Statutory Preemptions

Legislation on federal and state levels has partially alleviated the
problem of determining what is an unreasonable withholding of
consent. On the federal level, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (1968
Act)'" prohibits any refusal to sell or rent housing to an individual
because of race, religion, color, sex or national origin.'" Accordingly,
if a landlord refuses to consent to the transfer of a lease for any of
the reasons proscribed by the statute, the withholding of consent is
legislatively unacceptable and presumably unreasonable. Because
10. See, e.g., Moore v. Bannister, 269 So. 2d 291, 293 (La. App. 1972) (objections were
unreasonable when the proposed transferee was "a reputable, substantial business man who
had engaged in business in the area for several years ....
"; Haritas v. Goveia, 345 Mass.
774, 775, 188 N.E.2d 854, 855, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963) (objections are unreasonable
when the proposed transferees are "reputable persons of business experience and...
means."); Grossman v. S.E. Nichols Co., 43 App. Div. 2d 674, 675, 349 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747
(1st Dep't 1973) (mem.), aff'd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 985, 324 N.E.2d 888, 365 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1975)
(the "reasonable requirements of assignment" are "that there be -no default, that there be
continued liability, and that there be full assumption by a financially secure assignee.").
11. See United States v. Toulmin,253 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Johnson v. Jaquith, 189
So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Edelman v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 252 Ill. App. 142
(1929).
12. American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297
N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
13. The only relevant law review article which attempts to show when consent is reasonably withheld is Note, Effect of Leasehold Provisions Requiring the Lessor's Consent to
Assignment, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 516, 520-22 (1970). Treatises are likewise not very helpful.
See, e.g., RASCH, supra note 1, at 349 (which merely repeats the categories set forth in
American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297 N.Y.S.2d
156 (Sup. Ct. 1969); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.58 (Casner ed. 1952).
14. This Article will not attempt to answer collateral questions, such as whether particular consent provisions are covenants, or remedies available for breach of the provision. For a
discussion of these and other related topics, see generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 679 (1974).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1968
Actl.
16. Id. § 3604 (Supp. V, 1975).
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there are several exceptions to the 1968 Act its provisions should be
carefully examined if any question arises as to its applicability.' 7
Another relevant federal statute is the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act of 1974 (ECOA).'5 This Act prohibits any creditor from discriminating against any applicant for credit on the basis of sex or marital
status.'9 The statute defines credit to include the right to defer
payment of a debt or to incur debts.20 If the leasing of property, with
its concommitant undertaking to pay the full rent in monthly installments is deemed to be a "credit" transaction within the purview of this Act, then the ECOA applies and pro tanto preempts the
common law.
In addition, many states have enacted legislation similar in scope
and purpose to these federal statutes. Most states have some form
of fair housing law that makes it unlawful to discriminate on the
basis of race, religion, color, sex or national origin, 2 and some states
have enacted legislation similar to the ECOA making discrimination unlawful in credit transactions. 2 Many states make other
forms of discrimination unlawful as well and some of these anti17. Included among the exceptions to the 1968 Act's coverage are transactions involving
single family residencies or transactions not involving the services of a real estate broker or
agent and not involving the publication of any notice that indicates discrimination is being
practiced, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1970), or certain transactions involving a religious organization or a private club. Id. § 3607 (1970).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 a-e (Supp. V, 1975) [hereinafter cited as ECOA].
19. Id. § 1691(a).
20. Id. § 1691a(d).
21. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1954); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-405 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (West 1960); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 509.141 (West Supp. 1976); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §
11-11.1-1 (Supp. 1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(6) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 564.201 (1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.105 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976);
N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-4'(West 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1972); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4112.02(H)(1) (Page 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(h) (Purdon Supp. 1976); VA.
CODE ANN. § 36-86 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22 (1973).
22. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1812.30 (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-1-109
(1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-437 (West Supp. 1976); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02
(H)(3) (Page 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.20 (1975).
23. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 54.1(b) (West 1954) (physical disability, marital status);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (West 1960) (age, physical disability, marital status); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11.11.1-1 (Supp. 1976) (physical or mental disability); KAN. STAT. §
44.1009(c)(1) (Sipp. 1976) (blindness); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(6) (Michie/Law.
Co-op 1976) (age, blindness, marital status); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 564.201 (Supp. 1976)
(age, physical or mental disability, marital status); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1976)
(physical disability); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.5(9)(1) (McKinney 1972) (physical or mental
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discrimination provisions relate even to non-residential property.,
Finally, some jurisdictions have imposed a statutory requirement
that the landlord must not unreasonably withhold his consent to the
transfer of a lease, regardless of whether the lease contains such a
provison.2 ' When such legislation is applicable, it must be carefully
examined to determine whether it contains any provisions that
would preempt the common law meaning of the phrase. One example is the Alaska statute 21 purporting to set forth an exclusive list
of reasonable grounds for refusal to consent. However, even here the
common law parameters of reasonableness could help to clarify the
scope of the statute. Furthermore, they would continue to govern
the interpretation of commercial leases which are not subject to the
statute.
III. Common Law Definitions of "Reasonableness"
The use of the "reasonable man" standard accounts for the difficulty encountered in determining whether a particular withholding
of consent to the transfer of a lease is reasonable. Application of this
standard makes generalization difficult, since each case must be
determined on its own peculiar facts:Y
[Tihe propriety of each refusal to consent to a proposed sublease must
depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances. The basis asserted by
defendants for their unwillingness to approve of the underletting may be
justifiable in one instance, and not in another. No adjudication as to the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the defendants! conduct in the situation referred to in the complaint can be an authority as to the validity or
invalidity of a similar refusal on some other occasion.

The situation is further complicated by Anglo-American legal tradition, which views each piece of real property as unique and disdisability, martial status); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1968) (children); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 955(h) (Purdon Supp. 1976) (physical or mental disability).
24. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (West 1960); ILL. CONST., art. 1, § 17 (1971);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24 § 11-11.1-1 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.360 (1972); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 13-20(1) (Supp. 1976).
25. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
26. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1975).
27. Allen v. Carsted Realty Corp., 133 Misc. 359, 360, 231 N.Y.S. 585, 586 (Sup. Ct.
1928), a/i'd, 226 App. Div. 733, 233 N.Y.S. 688 (1st Dep't 1929). See also American Book Co.
v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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tinct from every other piece of realty." So while the circumstances
surrounding the withholding of consent in different situations may
be similar, the "uniqueness" of each piece of realty may require the
reasonable man to react differently in each situation. These considerations undoubtedly inspired one court's classic understatement:
"What constitutes the elements of unreasonableness in the act of
withholding consent presents a question not simple in resolution." 2' 9
Bearing this in mind, this Article shall attempt to isolate and explain the elements of reasonableness in withholding of consent situations.
A.

Reasonableness Implies Objective Considerations

Courts determine whether the withholding of consent to a transfer
of a lease is reasonable by using objective criteria only.3 Subjective
or arbitrary considerations are irrelevant,3 as are the mere whim
and caprice of the lessor. 32 An examination of relevant case law
underscores this point.
In Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. J.J.Hockenjos Co., "31 the lease
provided that the premises, a store, could not be assigned or sublet
without the prior written consent of the lessor, which was not to be
withheld unreasonably.34 The lease also provided that the premises
28. It is for this reason that the remedy of specific performance is available to enforce all
contracts for the sale of realty, but does not otherwise apply except in extraordinary circumstances. "A compensation in damages will not afford adequate relief; 'for the peculiar locality,
soil, vicinage, advantage of markets and the like conveniences of an estate contracted for,
cannot be replaced by other than land of equal value.'" Losee v. Morey & Cramer, 57 Barb.
Ch. (N.Y.) 561, 565 (1865), quoting Best v. Stow, 2 Sand. Ch. N.Y. 298, 301 (1861). See also
Haffner v. Dobrinski, 215 U.S. 446 (1910); Mechanics' Bank v. Seton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 298
(1828); Sinclar Refining Co. v. Miller, 106 F. Supp. 881 (D. Neb. 1952). The uniqueness
notion is not merely restricted to contracts calling for the conveyance of a fee estate. It has
been extended to agreements for the transfer of lesser estates such as leaseholds and easements. See, e.g., H. MCCLINTOCK, LAW OF EQUITY 106 (2d ed. 1948); W. WALSH, A TREATISE
ON EQuITY 304 (1930).
29. Mitchell's, Inc. v. Nelms, 454 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
30. American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 33-35,
297 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159-60 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
31. Id.; accord, Chanslor-Western Oil & Dev. Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 131 Il1.
App. 2d 527, 266 N.E.2d 405 (1970). See also Mitchell's, Inc., v. Nelms, 454 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1970); Grossman v. Barney, 359 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
32. Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. J.J. Hockenjos Co., 132 N.J.L. 229, 232, 39 A.2d 80,
82 (1944); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 526, 119 S.W. 400,
403 (1909).
33. 132 N.J.L. 229, 39 A.2d 80 (1944).
34. Id. at 230, 39 A.2d at 81.
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were to be used only as a paint store (except if the lessor agreed to
a different use, "which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.")35 The proposed sublessee intended to use the premises for
the sale of poultry. Though the case was remanded for a new trial
due to an evidentiary error, the court analyzed the provision as
follows: 36
Arbitrary considerations of personal taste, sensibility, or convenience do
not constitute the criteria of the landlord's duty under an agreement such as
this. Personal satisfaction is not the sole determining factor. Mere whim or
caprice, however honest the judgment, will not suffice . . . . The standard
is the action of a reasonable man in the landlord's position. What would a
reasonable man do in like circumstances? The term "reasonable" is relative
and not readily definable. As here used, it connotes action according to the
dictates of reason-such as is just, fair and suitable in the circumstances.

In American Book Co. v. Yeshiva University Development Foundation, Inc. ," the lessor was affiliated with an orthodox Jewish institution whose theology opposed the practice of birth control.
Accordingly, the lessor refused to permit the subleasing of space to
the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. The court decided
that the lessor's personal, philosophical views were irrelevant:"
The standards of "reasonableness" have not heretofore been clearly delineated by any single New York case, but are left to the trial court to determine
in accordance with the particular factual patterns before it, and the conceptual boundaries may be only faintly discerned in the few reported cases.
It would appear .
that the purported reasons for refusal of consent by
a landlord fall into two broad categories - objective and subjective. By
"objective" are meant those standards which are readily measurable criteria
of a proposed subtenant's or assignee's acceptability, from the point of view
of any landlord. ....
Most of these categories form a ready basis upon which to predicate a
"reasonable" refusal, and need no further elucidation.

The court concluded: "To the extent that rejection of a proposed
subtenancy is based upon the supposed need or dislikes of the landlord, a policy of judicial disapproval of such subjective criteria is
discernible.' °
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id., 39 A.2d at 81.
Id. at 232, 39 A.2d at 82.
59 Misc. 2d 31, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
Id. at 33-34, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 159-60.
Id. at 34, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
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The Lessor's Identity

Objective criteria do not vary with the identity of the lessor. "
Instead, ordinary and reasonable commercial standards are applied
to determine whether refusal to agree to a transfer is reasonable regardless of who the lessor may be."
[Wihen a religious or religiously affiliated or educational insititution operates a commercial enterprise or owns commercial property, it is to be held
to the established standards of commercial responsibility, its acts and conduct being vested with no greater and no lesser sanctity than those of any
other owner.

That the lessor may be a municipal corporation likewise does not
change the applicable standards. In Chanslor-Western Oil & Development Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary District4 2 the lessor was a
municipal corporation which refused to consent to the subletting of
the premises unless there was a renegotiation (and presumably an
increase) of rent. The lower court, in a declaratory judgment, held
that the lessor unreasonably refused its consent to the subletting. :'
On appeal, the lessor argued that as a municipal corporation, it was
entitled to demand a reappraisal of the rents analogous to the state
taxing authority's power to reassess and revalue property.4 4 But the
court rejected this contention, stating that in exercising nongovernmental functions, "a municipal corporation stands upon the
same footing as other corporations in regard to its property."4 5
Thus, at least with regard to commercial activities," the identity
40. See text accompanying notes 41-47 infra.
41. American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 36, 297
N.Y.S.2d 156, 162 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
42. 131 Ill. App. 2d 527, 266 N.E.2d 405 (1970).
43. Id. at 528, 266 N.E.2d at 406.
44. Id. at 530, 266 N.E.2d at 408.
45. Id. at 529, 266 N.E.2d at 407.
46. In both American Book Co. and Chanslor-Western, the courts stressed that commercial activities, and not religious (American Book Co.) or governmental (Chanslor-Western)
activities were in issue. Chanslor-Western Oil & Dev. Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 131
Ill. App. 2d 527, 529, 266 N.E.2d 405, 407 (1970); American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev.
Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 36, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156, 162 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Thus the issue
of whether different standards would apply to religious or governmental activities remains
open. Indeed, American Book Co. noted that section 259-b of the New York Real Property
Law is an exception to New York's anti-discrimination law, as it permits differences of creed
to be taken into account when property is owned by a religious institution and is used "for
religious purposes." 59 Misc. 2d at 36, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 162; see also N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §
259-b (McKinney 1972).
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of the lessor has no bearing on the standards used to determine
whether refusal to consent to the transfer of a lease is reasonable.
This result may be desirable from a policy standpoint since it injects
some modicum of uniformity into these situations. Lessees need
merely be concerned with the question of what is commercially
reasonable in the circumstances; they do not have to refine this
further, with reference to the lessor's character or identity. Predicting what a court will consider commercially reasonable in given
circumstances is difficult enough, a far worse situation would obtain
if the lessee's task were twofold, i.e., to guess whether in a particular
case the commercial standard applied, and then to ascertain what
is objectively reasonable for a church, municipal corporation, educational institution, and so on.
Furthermore, if the lessor's identity affected the applicable standard, the standard for the same premises could change each time
the property was sold. The court in American Book Co. recognized
these potential difficulties and appropriately held that the identity
of the lessor does not alter applicable standards. 7

2. Factors Taken Into Consideration
In applying the objective "reasonable man" standard, an interesting but difficult problem arises concerning the factual considerations which may be evaluated in determining whether consent has
been unreasonably withheld. A court must decide whether to consider only those factors which affect the particular unit whose
transfer is at issue or to include factors which affect other units or
properties as well.
In Krieger v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. , the lessor refused to consent
to the subleasing of office space on the ground that the proposed
sub-tenant was presently occupying office space in another building
owned by the lessor. The proposed sublessee's lease in the other
building was about to expire, and negotiations for a new lease were
47. American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 34, 297
N.Y.S.2d 156, 160-61 (Sup. Ct. 1969). American Book Co. and Chanslor-Western are the only
reported cases which deal specifically with the issue of the lessor's identity. Both of these
cases deal with commercial and not residential leases, but presumably, residential leases are
governed by similar rules.
48. 62 N.J. 423, 302 A.2d 129 (1973).
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in progress. The lessor withheld consent solely to prevent losing the
sublessee as a tenant in its other building. Holding that the lessor
unreasonably withheld his consent, the court stated: "The clause
[i.e., that the lessor shall not unreasonably withhold his consent]
is for the protection of the landlord in its ownership and operation
of the particular property-not for its general economic protection.
Otherwise the landlord could refuse consent if it had vacancies in
its other building."'"
In Houlder Bros. & Co. v. Gibbs,50 an English court ruled that a
lessor may not consider any factors extraneous to the lessor-lessee
relationship with respect to the particular premises in question. The
lease in Houlder Bros. provided that "[the lessee], will not, during
the said term, without the consent in writing of the lessor first
obtained, assign, sublet, or part with the possession of the hereby
demised premises, or any part thereof, such consent not to be withheld unreasonably in the case of a respectable and responsible person or corporation."'" Conceding that the proposed assignee was
respectable and responsible, the lessor nonetheless refused to permit
the assignment because: "[B]y the assignment I should lose Roneo,
Ld., as good tenants of No. 12 (the building adjoining No. 10, the
building under lease), and because I should have great difficulty in
finding any tenant for No. 12 in the present abnormal condition of
trade .... ",52 The court held that the lessor could not base its
decision on matters extraneous to the premises at issue, and held
the withholding unreasonable." Clearly then, where a lessor owns
several properties which are not otherwise interconnected, matters
affecting such other properties do not by themselves justify the
49. Id. at 424, 302 A.2d at 129.
50. [19251 1 Ch. 575.
51. Id. at 580.
52. Id. at 581.
53. Id. at 583. The court stressed the importance of the lessor-lessee relationship:
I think that one must look at these words in their relation to the premises, and to the
contract made in reference to the premises between the lessor and lessee; in other
words, one must have regard to the relation of lessor and lessee inter se, or, perhaps
one may add, to the due and proper management of the property. . . .But I do not
think the words of the covenant can be so interpreted as to entitle the lessor to exercise
the right of refusal when his reason given is one which is independent of the relation
between lessor and lessee, and is on grounds which are entirely personal to the lessor,
and wholly extraneous to the lessee.
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refusal to consent to a transfer of lease.
Where ownership of several premises is interconnected, matters
involving all of the lessor's properties may be considered. In Kroger
Co. v. Rossford Industrial Corp.,54 the owner of a shopping center
refused to permit the assignment of a store's lease because it was
not informed of the use to which the store would be put. While the
original lease contemplated use of the property as a retail food store,
the proposed assignment allowed any use of the premises other than
as a retail food store.5 5 The court held that the owner's refusal to
consent was reasonable because the store was part of an integrated
shopping center and it was possible that the nature of the sublessee's occupancy could adversely affect the entire shopping center.
Withholding of consent was justified not because of the sublessee's
potential effect on the leased premises alone, but rather because of
its possible effect on other related premises. This result may depart
from the rule that in the absence of any lease restriction, a transferee may employ premises for any legally permissible use.5"
A similar conclusion was reached in an English case, Governors
of Bridewell Hospital v. Fawkner & Rogers.57 There, the lessor refused to consent to an assignment of a lease to the Salvation Army,
claiming that "the use of the premises for the purposes of the Salvation Army might deteriorate the other property held by the corporation as governors of the hospital."5 8 The lease provided that the
premises could not be transferred without the lessor's consent, but
that consent was not to be unreasonably withheld. The court upheld
the lessor's position:"
Here was a body of gentlemen, holding a considerable estate in the City of
London, and they had to consider not merely the tenant of any particular
premises forming part of that estate . . .but the well-being of the whole
estate. It might be that one property was intended to be held for a purpose
which, however excellent in itself, might deteriorate the other properties.

Clearly, when an integrated realty complex is involved, it is proper
for the lessor to consider the effects of the transfer on the entire
complex.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

51 Ohio Op. 2d 382, 25 Ohio Misc. 43, 261 N.E.2d 355 (C.P. 1969).
Id. at 383, 25 Ohio Misc. at 44, 261 N.E.2d at 356.
Id.
8 T.L.R. 637 (1892).
Id.
Id.
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This reasoning clearly extends to multiple units within a single
building. In Premier Confectionery (London) Co. v. London Commercial Sale Rooms, Ltd., 0 a store and a kiosk in one building were
operated by a single lessee under two separate leases. Pursuant to a
lease requirement, both properties were being used as tobacconist
shops. The lessee went bankrupt and the liquidator (trustee) sought
to assign the lease of the kiosk only. The lease provided that the
lessor's consent was a prerequisite to transfer, but under English
law6 this was subject to an implied provision that consent was not
to be withheld unreasonably. The lessor withheld consent on the
ground that it would suffer economic harm if forced to lease the two
properties separately. The kiosk held a competitive advantage over
the store because it was so situated that it drew business away from
the store and its rent was only one-third that paid by the store.6" The
lessor feared that if the kiosk was rented independently of the store,
it would become impossible to lease the store at its current rental.
The court held that the lessor was entitled to consider how the
transfer of the kiosk would affect the other property in the building.
Since the lessor's fears were reasonable, so was its refusal to consent.63
Thus, when several properties form an integrated unit, the effect
of a sublease on the entire unit may be considered in determining
whether a refusal to consent is objectively reasonable. When common ownership is the properties' only shared characteristic, factors affecting non-transferred properties may not be considered in
determining whether consent to a transfer is reasonably refused.
No precise rule can determine the line between these two categories; the trier of fact will have to decide each case on its own distinctive facts and circumstances. Perhaps the most practical way to
determine whether properties are interrelated is to adopt a
"reasonable lessee" standard. Thus, where the mythical reasonable
man, acting as a lessee, knows or should know that a given lessor
owns other premises, then the lessor should be allowed to grant or
withhold consent based upon factors affecting such other premises.
Since it is customary for a lessor to own an entire building (as
60.
61.
62.
63.

[19331 1 Ch. 904.
Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 19(1).
[19331 1 Ch. at 910-11.
Id. at 911-13.
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opposed to just one store or one floor in a building), reason dictates
that he should be permittd to object to transfers which may
adversely affect other units within the building. If the building belongs to a larger unit of a type customarily owned by one person
(such as a shopping center or residential development), the lessor
should be able to consider factors affecting the larger unit as a
whole. But where common ownership is not necessarily the rule
(e.g., adjoining buildings may or may not be held by the same
owner), the lessor should not be permitted to consider factors affecting other premises. What is customary will depend on the locale and
the types of premised involved.
B.

Objective Reasonableness

A two-step test determines whether a refusal to consent to transfer of a lease is reasonable. First, it must be determined whether the
lessor's reason is unacceptable per se, even if true. An example of a
per se unacceptable reason would be any reason that is subjective
rather than objective. For instance, if the lessor, for no objective
reason, albeit honestly, dislikes the proferred transferee. Second, if
the lessor's reason is not per se unacceptable, the reason must be
scrutinized to determine if it is objectively acceptable under the
circumstances.

1. Per Se Unacceptable Reasons
The original lease is the governing instrument; its terms control
all of the relationships involved - not just the relationships between the lessor and the lessee but also between the lessor and all
subsequent transferees. Any attempt by the lessor or lessee to go
beyond the terms of the lease is impermissible and is per se unacceptable. Thus, a lessor may not condition his consent to a transfer
upon a revision of the lease terms. In Chanslor-Western Oil & Devel64 the lessor refused to
opment Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary District,
consent to a subletting unless there was a reappraisal of the premises and an increase in rent. The court held that consent was unreasonably withheld because the lessor was bound by the original
64.

131 Ill. App. 2d 527, 266 N.E.2d 405 (1970).
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lease, which did not provide for such rent increases. 5
If the original lease does not limit the use to which the premises
could be put, the lessor may not impose any such restrictions as a
condition for granting consent. In Roundup Tavern, Inc. v.
Pardini,5 the original lease placed no restrictions on the business
which could be operated on the leased premises. The lessor, however, objected to the proposed use of the premises as a tavern and
withheld his consent to the assignment. 7 The court held this reason
invalid because the original lease did not proscribe this use. 8
In Edelman v. F. W Woolworth Co.,"5 the lessors withheld consent to the subletting of a store because the proposed sublessee
would compete with the lessors, 0 who conducted a similar retail
store one block away. The original lease contained no limitation
upon the use of the store. The court held that the refusal to consent
was unreasonable: "[If

. .

.the plaintiffs had desired to prevent

the subletting of the premises to a business competitor they should
have so stated in the lease. Not having done so, we think their
objection to the subtenant, namely, that he would be a business
competitor of plaintiffs, was arbitrary and unwarranted."',
Just as the lessor is bound by his original bargain and cannot
change the terms of the lease, he cannot refuse to consent merely
because his lessee will make a profit on the transfer." A fortiori, he
cannot insist on receiving a share of the lessee's profit as the price
65. Id. at 530, 266 N.E.2d at 408. The court stated:
ITIhe District [lessori contends that . . .it may condition consent on a reappraisal
of the land and the establishment of a new rent schedule. In our view, it cannot be
seriously maintained that the parties contemplated a re-negotiation of the rental each
time consent to a sublease was requested. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with
the detailed provisions of the lease . . . . Consequently, we hold that defendant's
withholding of consent on the condition of reappraisal and establishment of a new rent
schedule is arbitrary and unreasonable.

Id.
66. 68 Wash. 2d 513, 413 P.2d 820 (1966).
67. Id. at 515, 413 P.2d at 821.
68. Id. at 515-16, 413 P.2d at 821-22.
69. 252 Ill.
App. 142 (1929).
70. For a more detailed discussion of the competitor issue, see text accompanying notes
134-36 infra.
71. 252 Ill.
App. at 145.
72. See Moore v. Bannister, 269 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 1972), where the lessor's silence was
deemed tacit approval of a subleasing, although the sublessee was paying more than double
the rent paid by the lessee.
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for his consent.73 Even where the lessor withholds consent because
he desires to reobtain the use of the premises, he continues to be
bound by the original lease provisions and his consent is unreasonably withheld." Several English cases have gone so far as to say that
the lessor's consent is unreasonably withheld even when he offers to
pay the lessee the same price that the transferee is to pay for the
proposed transfer."
Although virtually all of the cases indicate that the original lease
governs and limits the lessor's conduct, one notable exception de&serves discussion. In United States v. Toulmin,75 the lessor refused
to approve a proposed sublease and assignment" whereby the insolvent tenant would retain legal title to, as opposed to merely a right
to be paid for, certain fixtures installed by the tenant. The majority
held that the lessor's refusal to consent was reasonable because,"
the uninterrupted use of the fixtures . . .was essential to the continued

enjoyment of the property under the sub-lease and assignment, and thus to
the landlord's receipt of rent. The proposed retention by the then insolvent
tenant of complete legal title, instead of its lesser equitable monetary interest, in the fixtures might well have allowed the tenant's creditors to interrupt
or terminate that enjoyment and receipt of rent.

If the principle that the lessor is bound by the lease provisions were
applied here, it would seem that the lessor should not have been
permitted to withhold consent. Judge Bazelon recognized this in his
dissenting opinion: "Complications resulting from shared property
rights in fixtures seem . . .irrelevant. They would grow from the

provisions of the lease and should be held to have been within the
contemplation of the parties when they bargained for a right to
sublease."7
The precise meaning of Toulmin is very difficult to determine
since the facts involved are not presented in detail. Adding to the
73. Bedford Inv. Co. v. Folb, 79 Cal. App. 2d 363, 180 P.2d 361 (1947).
74. Cedarhurst Park Apartments, Inc. v. Milgrim, 55 Misc. 2d 118, 284 N.Y.S.2d 330
(Nassau Dist. Ct. 1967).
75. In re Winfrey & Chatterton's Agreement, [19211 2 Ch. 7; Bates v. Donaldson, [1896]
2 Q.B. 241.
76. 253 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
77. The opinion does not explain the exact nature of the proposed transfer. It merely refers
to a "proposed sublease and proposed assignment." Id. at 348.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 349 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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confusion is the court's puzzling statement that this is not a case
where "the landlord was unreasonably attempting to modify or revoke the original lease terms relating to the fixtures." ' " The court's
statement can be interpreted in two diametrically opposed ways:
(1) that any modification in the original lease terms is ipso facto
unreasonable; or (2) that in some instances, such as the present
one, certain modifications of the original lease terms can be
reasonable.
In addition the court stated that "The landlord acted on advice
of counsel, who pointed out to him reasonable objections relating to
both the proposed sub-lessee-assignee and to the terms of the proposed sub-lease and assignment."'" If there were reasonable objections relating to the proposed transferee, the entire discussion of the
objections to the terms of the proposed sublease and assignment
were beside the point. The dissent discounts this possibility because
the only objection the lessor expressed was that the sublease would
leave ownership of the fixtures in the insolvent tenant. 2
Whether Toulmin is an example of a hard case making bad law
or whether its facts are so unusual that it is limited to them is not
of critical importance. Nonetheless, it stands, over the able dissent
of Judge Bazelon, as perhaps the only case that does not strictly
limit the lessor by the terms of the original lease.
Two further observations are in order concerning per se unreasonableness. First, the discussion has heretofore focused upon lease
terms which restrict the lessor by creating a limited territory in
which he can move, but beyond whose borders lie per se unreasonableness. However, it is also settled that the original lease terms
similarly limit what the lessee can do. Thus, in Mitchell's, Inc. v.
Nelms,13 the court held that the lessor acted reasonably in refusing
to consent to a sublease which would bind him to a longer term at
a lower rent. "4 The lease provided that if a new tenant was found
by September 1, 1962, the new tenant would have a right to a fifty
year term. Otherwise the lease terminated in six years subject to an
option to extend for ten more years. Similar provisions governed the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 348.
Id. at 348 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 349.
454 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
Id. at 815.
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rent." The proposed sublease was entered into after September 1,
1962, but purported to grant a fifty year term; the rent was based
on the pre-September 1, 1962 formula. The lessor refused to consent
to the sublease unless he received a substantial increase in rent. The
court held this refusal reasonable because the lessee was acting
beyond the scope of the original lease.85
The second observation is that the lessor cannot object to a transfer merely because it involves an assignment and a sublease instead
of either one alone. In Fabulous Stationers, Inc. v. Regency Joint
Venture, 7 the lease provided that the lessee could "assign or sublet
this lease only with the written consent of the landlord, first had and
obtained, which consent the landlord shall not unreasonably withhold." 88 The contemplated arrangement called for a sublease until
such time as the full purchase price was paid; then the tenant would
assign the lease to the sublessee and the sublessee would reassign
the lease in escrow as a security device in the event of any subsequent default by the sublessee. The lessor did not object to either
an assignment or a sublease, but he did object to a combination of
the two. The court held that it was doubtful whether the word "or"
in the lease prevented a combined arrangement and in view of the
ambiguity, it resolved the provision against its draftsman, the
lesser."
85. Id. at 811.
86. Id. at 814-15. Likewise, in Filmways, Inc. v. 477 Madison Avenue, Inc., 36 App. Div.
2d 609, 318 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1st Dep't 1971), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 597, 282 N.E.2d 119, 331
N.Y.S.2d 31 (1972), the lessor refused to consent to a sublease because he objected to the fact
that the sublease did not restrict the right of the sublessee to further sublet, nor did it place
limitations on the sublessee's occupany, similar to the limitations placed on the lessee by the
lease. The majority in the appellate division, as well as in the court of appeals, held that
the lessor's refusal to consent was unreasonable because the sublessee was, in actuality,
bound to the same terms and conditions as were contained in the original lease. 36 App. Div.
2d at 609, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 506, affd, 30 N.Y.2d at 598, 282 N.E.2d at 119, 331 N.Y.S.2d at
31.
The dissenters in both the appellate division and the court of appeals reasoned that the
document which purportedly limited the sublessee's rights was invalid, and hence the sublessee would have greater rights than provided in the lease. 30 N.Y.2d at 601-03, 282 N.E.2d at
122, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 33-35 (Scileppi, J., dissenting) (mem.); 36 App. Div. 2d at 609-10, 318
N.Y.S.2d at 507 (McGiven, J., dissenting) (mem.). In any event, it seems clear that if a
transferee could get greater rights than contained in the lease, even the majority in Filmways
would concede that the lessor would be acting reasonably in refusing his consent.
87. 44 App. Div. 2d 547, 353 N.Y.S.2d 766 (lst Dep't 1974).
88. Id. at 547, 353 N.Y.S. 2d at 767-68.
89. Id. at 547, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
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Reasonableness as a Function of Facts and Circumstances

Determining which reasons may be the basis for a reasonable
refusal to consent to the transfer of a lease present difficult questions of law. Acceptable reasons generally fall into three categories:
(1) objections concerning the financial status of the proposed transferee; (2) objections concerning the reputation or identity of the
transferee; and (3) objections concerning the proposed use or occupancy of the premises.'"

a. Financial Considerations
Since the lessor is entrusting to the lessee and to any subsequent
transferee a very valuable property for an extended period of time,
the financial ability of the person using the property is an obviously
important concern to the lessor. The lessor's interest extends beyond the simple assurance that the rent will be paid on time; the
transferee must be financially able to comply with all of the lease
requirements. Fulfillment of lease obligations to keep the premises
in good repair or to remodel or restore the premises after a specified
number of years are as important as the monthly rent receipts.
Similarly, where the lease requires that the premises be used as a
"first class" theatre, hotel, or other similar venture, it is to the
lessor's interest to assure himself that the tenant in possession has
the financial wherewithal to do more than just meet the monthly
rental payment."'
90. In American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 33,
297 N.Y.S.2d 156, 160 (Sup. Ct. 1969), the court listed four categories of objections:
(a) financial responsibility
(b) the "identity" or "business character" of the subtenant - i.e., his suitability
for the particular building

(c)

the legality of the proposed use

(d) the nature of the occupancy-i.e., office, factory, clinic, or whatever.
However, the authors, while basically in agreement with the court's analysis, have combined

(c) and (d) into one category dealing generally with objections to the proposed use and
occupancy of the premises and we have also expanded category (b) to encompass also personal
objections to the proposed transferees and not merely objections dealing with the suitability
of the transferee for the particular building.
91. Although from a logical point of view this seems to be a most basic consideration
(since what is involved is a money-making venture by the lessor), it is surprising to find that
no reported cases even attempt to generalize as to the considerations encompassed by the
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It is impossible to formulate mathematically precise rules to determine when a lessor's refusal to consent is unreasonable; however,
certain guidelines are evident from the cases. For instance, it is not
necessary that the proposed transferee actually be insolvent to be
objectionable. It is sufficient that the transferee has a history of
being delinquent in meeting financial obligations. In Mowatt v. 1540
Lake Shore Drive Corp.,"2 the Seventh Circuit held that the board
of directors of a cooperative apartment building acted reasonably
when it refused to consent to the transfer to a proposed subtenant
who "was slow in payment, and had suffered 4 judgments in 2
years." 93 The board was also reasonable when it refused to consent
to a transfer to a person who "had reneged or defaulted on a number
of substantial charitable pledges" and whose financial capacity to
fulfill the lease was therefore in question."4
Mowatt also raises the possibility that if the proposed transferee
had gone through a bankruptcy proceeding, this might also be a
sufficient cause for withholding consent. However, in Mowatt, the
board of directors was also aware of rumors that the proposed transferee's brother was involved in illegal activities and one person who
had given a written recommendation on behalf of the proposed
transferee, later withdrew it orally. Thus, it is unclear whether a
proposed transferee's bankruptcy would be sufficient cause for withholding consent. 5 Nevertheless, the court listed it as one of. the
factors validly taken into account by the board of directors."
terms "financial ability" or "financial means of the transferee." Many cases refer to financial
considerations but do not explain what they are. See, e.g., Moore v. Bannister, 269 So. 2d
291, 293 (La. App. 1972)(It is unreasonable when the transferee is "a reputable, substantial
business man . . . who is actually paying more than double the rent as sublessee than lessee
is paying.
...
); Haritas v. Goveia, 345 Mass. 774, 775, 188 N.E.2d 854, 855, cert. denied,
375 U.S. 845 (1963)(It is unreasonable where the assignees were "reputable persons of business experience and financial means."); Grossman v. S.E. Nichols Co,, 43 App. Div. 2d 674,
349 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1st Dep't 1973), aff'd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 985, 324 N.E.2d 888, 365 N.Y.S.2d
531 (1975) (reasonable requirements for consent are: "that there be no default, that there be
continued liability, and that there be full assumption by a financially secure assignee.").
Perhaps because financial ability is such a basic consideration it is taken for granted and no
attempt is made to analyze its precise meaning. But see Reget v. Dempsey-Tegler & Co., 70
Ill. App. 2d 32, 216 N.E.2d 500 (1966).
92. 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967).
93. Id.
94. Id.at 138.
95. Id.
96. Id.It should be noted that this transferee's company was also the defendant in a
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In determining whether a proffered objection to the transferee on
financial grounds, another perplexing issue arises when the original
tenant offers to guaranty the payment of rent by the transferee.
Does this guaranty automatically vitiate the lessor's objection?
Adams, Harkness & Hill, Inc. v. Northeast Realty Corp.,"7 holds
that it does. The lease in Adams provided that the lessor's written
consent to an assignment or sublease was not to be unreasonably
withheld." When the lessee submitted the name of the proposed
subtenant, the lessor demanded the subtenant's complete financial
statement. The lessee provided some financial information, but not
the full financial statements requested. He also assured the lessor
"that [he] would agree to be responsible for the payment of rent"
if the subtenant was accepted." The lessor refused to consent. The
court affirmed the trial court's finding that consent was unreasonably withheld: "[tihis finding was warranted by the evidence, particularly in view of the undisputed evidence that Harkness [the
lessee] had offered to guarantee the payment of the rent by Mann
00
[the proposed subtenant] for the entire term of the lease."'
A contrary view is espoused in Johnson v. Jaquith,10which holds
that there are other considerations besides the mere payment of the
rent and that a guaranty of only the payment of the rent does not
obviate all other possible objections." 2
The lease in Johnson contained various covenants whereby the
lessee agreed to maintain the premises in good repair, to indemnify
the lessor for all claims arising out of the lessee's use of the premises,
and to repair any damage caused by removal of fixtures pursuant
to the lease. 0'° When the lessee attempted to obtain the lessor's
substantial lawsuit brought on grounds of fraud. Id. In Riggs. v. Murdock, 10 Ariz. App. 248,
458 P.2d 115 (1969), the court held that the lessor acted reasonably in refusing to consent to
a proposed subtenant who "had a poor payment record and difficulties with the law." Id. at
250, 458 P.2d at 117, 119. Since the court was specific about this proposed subletting, it is
difficult to gauge the relevant potency of the financial considerations as opposed to objections
dealing with the character of the subtenants. However, it would appear, in the absence of
any indication to the contrary, that both were equally valid reasons.
97. 361 Mass. 552, 281 N.E.2d 262 (1972).
98. Id. at 553, 281 N.E.2d at 264.
99. Id. at 554, 281 N.E.2d at 264.
100. Id. at 557, 281 N.E.2d at 265.
101. 189 So. 2d 827 (Fla. App. 1966).
102. Id. at 829.
103. Id. at 828.
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consent to an assignment, the lessor refused to consent unless he
was furnished with a copy of the assignee's certified financial statements. Although the lessee offered to guaranty the "rent payments," the court held that the refusal was reasonable because there
were factors other than payment of the rent that the lessor was
0
entitled to consider. '
Analyzing the Adams-Johnson split, it seems that Johnson is
clearly the better reasoned view, since there are many financial
considerations other than the mere payment of rent. "" Furthermore,
if the lessee is the original tenant who signed the lease, local law
often dictates that by virtue of his privity of contract with the lessor
he will always remain liable for the rent.'"' Under the Adams rule
this lessee would always be able to transfer his lease to anyone
regardless of the lease provisions requiring the lessor's consent.
This analysis of financial considerations must discuss two other
situations. The first involves United States v. Toulmin. 07 Although
the precise limits of Toulmin are impossible to define, the opinion
clearly raises the possibility that an insolvent lessee could be subjected to greater restrictions than a solvent one. In the usual situation, the lessee retains legal title to his fixtures until the end of the
lease term or until such time as the lease prescribes. Transfer of the
lease in the interim would seem to have no bearing upon this. However, under Toulmin, it seems that the lessor can refuse to consent
to the transfer on the sole ground that the lessee is insolvent-even
if the lessee is not in default of any provision of the lease.'"' Notably,
both the majority'"9 and. the dissent"0 pointed out that the lessee's
104. Id. at 829. See also Grossman v. Barney, 359 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), where
the lessors were not furnished with sufficient financial data about the proferred sublessee and
the lessee offered to guaranty payment of the rent. Here the court found that there were other
considerations apart from the rent and the lessor did not act arbitrarily in refusing to consent
to the subletting. Id. at 477. It should be noted, however, that the lease here did not contain
a provision permitting transfer only with the lessor's consent, such consent not to be unreasonably witheld.
105. See text.accompanying notes 119-22 infra.
106. See, e.g., Peiser v. Mettler, 50 Cal. 2d 594, 328 P.2d 953 (1958); Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. Kesner, 296 I1. App. 187, 16 N.E.2d 175 (1938); Gillette Bros. v. Aristocrat Rest., Inc.,
239 N.Y. 87, 145 N.E. 748 (1924).
107. 253 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See notes 76-82 supra and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 349 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 348. ("This is not a case where a landlord has witheld his consent solely because
of the insolvency of the tenant...").
110. Id. at 349 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). "My colleagues do not hold that the tenant's
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insolvency alone is not sufficient justification for the lessor's with-

holding of consent. Neither opinion, however, seemed to realize that
the court's holding paves the way for this possibly unjustified result.
The other situation is presented in the English case of In Re Town
Investments Ltd. I"In Town Investments, the court held that a lessor reasonably withheld his consent to a transfer which provided
that the lessee would receive a large lump-sum from the transferee
upon the signing of a sublease, followed by low, below market level
monthly rental payments." 2 The court was convinced that if the
lessors subsequently attempted to sell or mortgage the premises, the
low monthly rent would prove an embarrassment and result in a
lower sales price or a lower mortgage."- While this case is unusual,
it nevertheless demonstrates that all relevant considerations will be
taken into account in determining whether consent is being unreasonably withheld.

b.

Reputation or Identity of the Transferee

Of the three categories of potentially acceptable objections which
a lessor may raise in opposing transfer of a lease this category seems
to be the most subjective. It is perhaps therefore not surprising to
discover that the case law provides very few guidelines. However, it
is firmly established that purely subjective reasons for refusing consent are per se unacceptable."'
The only other definitive principles, at least in a commercial setting, are that a lessor may not withold his consent because the
proposed transferee engages in "controversial" activities or because
the proposed transferee has different religious or philosophical
views." As the court stated in American Book Co.:"
If indeed the potential for controversy were a serviceable standard for measuring the acceptability of a subtenancy, many of our most socially useful
insolvency gives the landlord the power to prevent subleasing generally. .
tenant does not default, his involvency does not affect his tenancy." Id.
111. (1954) 1 Ch. 301.
112. Id.at 301-04.
113. id.at 315.
114.

.

.So long as the

See text accompanying notes 64-89 supra.

115. American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 35-36,
297 N.Y.S.2d 156, 162 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
116. Id. at 36-37, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 162-63.
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institutions would be homeless vagrants on the streets, and our buildings
would be tenanted by bland, unexceptionable models of propriety and dullness. Even proponents of unpopular ideas are entitled to a roof over their
heads. Landlords are not censors-their dominion is over realty, not ideas.

The court also noted that even if the lessor objected to the transfer
on philosophical or religious grounds, this was not a sufficiently
reasonable basis for withholding consent." 7
Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive, Corp.,"' and Riggs v.
Murdock " listed numerous objections to the identity or reputation
of prospective transferees which might be reasonable grounds for
refusing to consent to a transfer: (1) a widespread and longstanding
reputation in financial circles indicating that the transferee's
brother was involved in illegal activities;" (2) the transferee's company was subject to a substantial lawsuit on the ground of fraud;'
(3) the transferee had previous difficulties with the law;' or (4) the
transferees, husband and wife, were inclined to make angry scenes
in public, sufficient to make observers uncomfortable.'
Except for the fourth reason, all of the other reasons were coupled
with additional objections. 4 Therefore, it is unclear whether each
reason by itself is sufficient to justify a lessor's refusal to consent to
a transfer. Moreover, the first, second, and fourth reasons, arose in
a situation which involved the transfer of residential leases in a
cooperative apartment house.2 5 Whether these reasons would be
sufficient in a commercial context remains an open question.
Pletz v. StandardHomes Co.,2' suggests that misconduct by the
proposed transferee may be another possible ground for withholding
consent. In Pletz, the assignee refused to disclose the intended use
117. Id. at 37, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
118. 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967).
119. 10 Ariz. App. 248, 458 P.2d 115 (1969).
120. 385 F.2d at 137. However, additional facts compounded the situation; the transferee
had undergone a bankruptcy proceeding and a written recommendation on his behalf had
been orally withdrawn. Id. at 137-38.
121. Id. at 138. But in addition, the transferee had reneged or defaulted on a number of
charitable contributions and his financial reliability was therefore in question. Id.
122. 10 Ariz. App. at 250, 458 P.2d at 117. Here again, however, the transferee also had a
poor payment record. Id.
123. 385 F.2d at 138.
124. See notes 120-22 supra and accompanying text.
125. See Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967).
126. 342 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
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of the premises.' Additionally, during the course of the negotiations about a possible assignment, a news story appeared that the
proposed assignee already had an option to sublease the premises;' 5
testimony at trial revealed that the proposed assignee had sought
to induce a school district to condemn a portion of the subject premises; and finally, there was testimony that the proposed assignee, or
some of his commercial tenants in the area, had used the subject
premises as a dump.' 9 The court held that consent was reasonably
withheld in these circumstances. 30
It is unclear whether these grounds, standing alone, are sufficient
to justify the lessor's refusal to consent to a proposed transfer, since
the "misconduct" grounds were coupled with another clearly sufficient ground - failure of the proposed transferee to disclose his
intended use of the premises 3 ' - and the court did not indicate
which of the reasons formed the basis of its decision.

c.

Proposed Use or Occupancy of the Premises
In the absence of any lease restrictions,'3 2 the lessee (and the
transferee) may use the premises in any lawful manner not materially different from that for which the premises were adapted. 3" Similarly, where the lease does not restrict the use to which the premises
can be put, the lessor may not withhold consent merely because the
proposed transferee will compete either with the lessor 3 ' or with
127. At one point the proposed assignee did state that he was "going to take a bulldozer
and run through that main building." Id. at 621. However, it is unclear whether he was
serious. In any event, this does not amount to a disclosure of how he intended to use the
property.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 621-22.
131. See discussion accompanying note 144 infra.
132. See text acccmpanying notes 66-71 supra.
133. Thus, in Roundup Tavern, Inc., v. Pardini, 68 Wash. 2d 513, 413 P.2d 820 (1966),
the lessor refused to consent to an assignment of a lease on the sole ground that the assignee
proposed to use the premises as a tavern. No lease restriction limited the use of which the
premises could be put, and the court accordingly held that the lessors had acted unreasonably
in witholding his consent to the transfer. Id. at 515, 413 P.2d at 820. See Texaco, Inc. v.
Greenwich-Kinney, Inc., 39 App. Div. 2d 877, 333 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1st Dep't 1972), aff'd mem.,
32 N.Y.2d 910, 347 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1973), where the lease did restrict the permissible uses of
the premises and the court enforced the restriction.
134. Edelman v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 252 Ill. App. 142 (1929).
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another tenant.'3 ' Yet if the lease proscribes competition with other
tenants, this is reasonable ground for the lessor to refuse to consent
to a transfer.'3 6
One example of an objectionable use is breaking up the premises
into fragments and separately transferring each fragment. Time,
Inc. v. Tager'37 involved the Time-Life building, "a prestige building," in New York City's Rockefeller Center.'38 Despite a lease provision stating that the premises could only be sublet "in whole,"' 3 the
lessor had previously consented to a sublease of half the premises.
When a new subtenant moved into the remaining half over the
lessor's refusal to consent, the lessor exercised his option to terminate the lease. The lessor thereafter entered into leases with the two
subtenants who were already in the premises. The tenant sued the
lessor for breach of covenant (i.e., unreasonably refusing to consent)
and for unlawful interference with his contractual relations with the
subtenants.
The court recognized that the lessor's entry into direct leases with
the rejected subtenants was "persuasive in indicating that the subtenants were perfectly acceptable in their own right and that the
landlord could raise no substantial objection as to their financial
responsibility, or their respectability, or the character of their business.""'4 Nevertheless, the court held that the lessor acted reasonably in refusing to consent to the subletting:'
135. Theunissen v. Huyler's, Inc., 25 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1928); see also Pletz v. Standard
Homes Co., 342 S.W. 2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
136. Butterick Publishing Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.S.
86 (Sup. Ct. 1928); see also Arrington v. Walter E. Heller Int'l Corp., 30 111. App. 3d 631, 333
N.E.2d 50 (1975).
137. 46 Misc. 2d 658, 260 N.Y.S. 2d 413 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1965).
138. Id. at 659, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
139. Id. at 658, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
140. Id. at 659, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
141. Id. When a lessee is faced with the burden of proving that a lessor's consent was
unreasonably witheld, one dispositive way of meeting this burden of proof is to show that the
lessor, after rejecting the proferred transferee, entered into a lease (whether of the same
premises or of other premises in the same building) with the rejected transferee.
Since Time, Inc., involved a "prestige" building, the lessor's refusal to consent was held
reasonable. But when there are no such special considerations, such refusal will be held
unreasonable. Gamble v. New Orleans Housing Mart, Inc., 154 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 1963).
See also Health and Beauty Studios, Inc. v. Gray, 48 App. Div. 2d 632, 368 N.Y.S.2d 200
(1st Dep't 1975); In Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinique Assoc., 12 N.Y.2d 339, 190
N.E.2d 10, 239 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1963), the court held that such conduct, at least when coupled
with a payment by the lessee to the lessor to release the lessee from its obligations under the
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It is one thing to permit a tenant to assign or sublet to a successor-in-interest
or a purchaser of its business. It is quite another to permit a tenant in a
prestige building to subdivide and lease out space to numerous subtenants
at a profit to himself. The refusal of a landlord under such circumstances to
grant consent appears to be entirely justifiable. The owner of a prestige
building, in order to maintain its status and desirability, may well require
that space in its building be rented in substantial blocs lest the premises be
Balkanized so that it becomes known as veritable rabbit-warren of "hole-inthe-walls" and rented desk spaces.

The extent to which multiple subleases are objectionable in "nonprestige" buildings, remains undecided. Presumably, there comes a
point where further subdivision of premises makes it the nonprestige equivalent of a rabbit-warren of "holes-in-the-walls" and is
objectionable."' 2
Another reasonable objection is to the use of the leased premises
in a manner that does not comport with the intended use of the
entire property. In Kroger Co. v. Rossford Industrial Corp.,"' the
lessor was held to have reasonably refused to consent to a transfer
in the absence of assurances that the premises, which were located
within the shopping center, would be put to a use consistent with
the general use of the shopping center. It should be noted that to
the extent that Kroger permitted the lessor to bar a use of the
premises not prohibited by the lease, it is an exception to the rule
that the lease governs relationships between all parties. However,
it is a most limited exception.

3.

Miscellaneous Considerations

All of the objections heretofore discussed presuppose that the
lessor has received information sufficiently detailed to enable him
to make a fully informed appraisal of the circumstances. If the
tenant or the transferee refused to disclose any pertinent informalease, amounted to a fraud on the lessee. Id. at 342, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 662. Here, however, since
the lease did not provide that the lessor could not unreasonably withold its consent to the
transfer of the lease, the court held that there was no actionable wrong. Id. at 342-44, 239
N.Y.S.2d at 662-64.
142. Premier Confectionary (London) Co. v. London Commercial Sale Rooms, Ltd.
[19331 1 Ch. 904, is an example of a situation where multiple transferees were deemed
reasonably objectionble. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
143. 51 Ohio Op. 2d 382, 25 Ohio Misc. 43, 261 N.E.2d 355 (C.P. 1969)
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tion, the lessor is not required to act at his peril; failure to submit
the necessary data is itself sufficient ground to justify the lessor's
44
refusal to consent.
In addition, an interesting problem arises when the transfer,
which requires the lessor's consent, occurs as a result of the incorporation of the previous tenant. Thus, if the only change is one of form
(i.e., where all of the tenant's previous activities and assets are
transferred to the corporation), there appears to be no reason why
4
the lessor should be able to withhold his consent. ' 1
In Grossman v. S.E. Nichols Co., 4 store facilities were rented to
a two-man partnership pursuant to thirteen leases. Upon the death
of one of the partners, the remaining partner incorporated (pursuant
to the partnership agreement) and transferred all partnership assets
and liabilities to the corporation. The lessor refused to consent to
the assignments of the leases. After finding that the lessor's stated
objections on financial grounds were baseless, the court held that
since there was substantial identity between the assignor and assignee and since the corporation was otherwise an unobjectionable
tenant, the lessor's consent was unreasonably withheld. 1 '
If, however, more than a mere change in form is involved, the
lessor's objections would appear to be judged by all of the criteria
discussed herein.
IV.

Conclusion

When a lease provides that the lessor's consent is needed for a
transfer of the lease but that such consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld, the basic framework for deciding whether a refusal to
144. Johnson v. Jaquith, 189 So. 2d 827 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Kroger Co. v. Rossford
indus. Corp., 51 Ohio Op. 2d 382, 25 Ohio Misc. 43, 261 N.E.2d 355 (C.P. 1969); Pletz v.
Standard Homes Co., 342 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); A. Harris & Co. v. Campbell,
187 S.W. 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
The court in Johnson v. Jaquith indicated that:
Until plaintiff [lessor] was furnished satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the
proposed assignee to meet all of the obligations under the lease the plaintiff was
justified in refusing to consent to an assignment of the lease.
189 So. 2d at 829.
145. See Grossman v. S.E. Nichols Co., 43 App. Div. 2d 674, 349 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1st
Dep't 1973), aff'd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 985, 324 N.E.2d 888, 365 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1975).
146. 43 App. Div. 2d 674, 349 N.Y.S.2d 745, (lst Dep't 1973), aff'd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 985,
324 N.E.2d 888, 365 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1975).
147. 43 App. Div. 2d at 675, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
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consent is reasonable or unreasonable is provided by the lease itself.
Neither the lessor nor the lessee or transferee may alter, or go beyond, the lease terms. Within the boundaries of the lease, objective
considerations based on financial grounds, on the identity or reputation of the proposed transferee or on the proposed use of the premises will provide reasonable grounds for a refusal to consent. Refusals based upon other considerations will be unreasonable.

